Su Shi · 策斷 中
Su Shi 蘇軾 · Policy Treatise 論 · no. 112 in the anthology order
策斷 中 Policy Assessment Part II
Translator's notes · 10 · Korean
- 역주1 策斷 中: 이 글은 〈策斷〉 3편 가운데 두 번째 편으로 본래의 제목은 〈策斷 二〉이다. 本集에는 편 머리에 ‘臣聞’ 두 字가 있다.
- 역주2 句踐之取吳 是驕之而已: 춘추시대에 吳王 夫差가 越王 句踐과 會稽山에서 싸워 승리하였는데, 句踐이 목숨을 구걸하자 夫差는 句踐을 죽여야 한다는 伍員(伍子胥)의 말을 듣지 않고, 많은 공물을 받고 句踐을 풀어주었다. 그 후 句踐은 范蠡와 文種을 등용하고 선정을 베풀어 국력을 강화시키면서 외면으로는 吳나라를 臣妾처럼 지극정성으로 받들어 吳王 夫差의 의심을 풀고 그를 교만에 빠지게 하였다. 그 결과, 吳王 夫差는 패업을 이루기 위해 국력을 낭비하다가 笠澤의 싸움에서 句踐에게 대패하여 마침내 자신은 죽고 나라는 멸망하였다.
- 역주3 秦之取諸侯 是散其從而已: 秦나라가 날로 강성해지자 列國들이 두려워하였는데, 蘇秦이 합종책으로 제후들을 설득하여 六國을 연합시켜서 스스로 六國의 재상을 겸하고 從約長이 되어 秦나라에 대항하니, 秦나라가 곤경에 처하게 되었다. 이에 秦나라는 張儀를 등용하여 제후들에게 자국의 이익을 우선할 것을 설득하여 合從을 해산하고 개별적으로 秦나라와 우호관계를 맺는 連橫策을 따르게 하였다. 이후 秦나라는 차례로 제후들을 정벌하여 天下를 통일할 수 있었다.
- 역주4 高祖之取項籍 是間疏其君臣而已: 項籍은 項羽를 칭한 것으로 羽는 그의 字이다. 漢 高祖인 劉邦이 項羽에게 연전연패하였는데, B.C. 205년에 陳平에게 계책을 물으니, 대답하기를 “項王(項羽)의 꼿꼿한 신하는 亞父인 范增과 鍾離昧, 龍且, 周殷 등 몇 명에 불과합니다. 大王께서 진실로 수만 근의 黃金을 내놓으시어 反間의 계책을 써서 저 楚나라의 군주와 신하들을 이간시킨다면, 項羽는 의심이 많은 인물이므로 반드시 남의 모함하는 말을 듣고 그들을 제거할 것이니, 이 틈을 타서 우리가 공격하면 틀림없이 楚나라를 격파할 것입니다.”라고 하였다. 이에 劉邦은 황금 4만 근을 내어 陳平에게 주고 出納을 일체 묻지 않았다. 陳平은 이 황금을 가지고 수많은 첩자들을 매수하여 楚나라에 소문을 퍼뜨리기를 “鍾離昧 등은 項王의 장수가 되어 많은 공을 세웠으나 지금까지 봉지를 받아 王이 되지 못하였다. 이 때문에 漢나라와 은밀히 연합하여 項氏를 멸망하고 그 땅을 나누어 가지려 한다.”라고 하였다. 項王은 그 말을 듣고 鍾離昧 등을 의심하기 시작하였다. 또 項羽와 范增을 이간시키기 위하여 項羽의 사자가 漢王의 진영에 당도하자 太牢의 禮로 성대하게 음식을 준비하게 했다가, 이윽고 사자가 연회석에 당도하자 漢王이 갑자기 거짓 놀라는 체하며 ‘나는 范亞父의 사자인 줄 알았더니, 뜻밖에 項王의 사자였구려!’라고 하고 侍者들을 불러 들여오던 음식을 가져가도록 하고, 項王의 사자를 위해서 간단하게 차린 음식상을 들여오도록 명하였다. 사자가 돌아와 그 사실을 고하자, 項王은 范增이 漢나라와 비밀리에 내통하고 있지나 않은가 의심하여 范增의 권력을 서서히 빼앗았다. 이에 范增은 화가 나서 벼슬자리를 내놓고 ‘天下의 일이 크게 정해졌으니, 大王께서 직접 하소서.’라고 하고, 떠났는데 彭城에 이르기 전에 등에 등창이 나서 죽었다. 項羽는 이후 謀士다운 謀士가 없어 더욱 고립되었으며 또 鍾離昧 등의 장수들까지 제거하여 결국 멸망에 이르렀다. 太牢는 소와 양과 돼지를 각각 한 마리씩 잡아 통째로 올리는 것으로, 옛날 제왕의 큰 제사나 큰 손님에게 올리는 성대한 상차림이며, 亞父는 范增에 대한 項羽의 존칭이다.
- 역주5 管仲曰……攻瑕則堅者瑕: 管仲은 春秋時代 齊나라의 名相으로 이름이 夷吾이며, 仲은 그의 字인데 평소 字로 행세하였다. 潁上 사람으로 원래 桓公의 政敵이었으나 桓公의 중신인 鮑叔牙의 천거로 재상이 되어 桓公을 도와 齊나라를 강대국으로 만들었으며 최초로 제후를 규합하여 天下의 패업을 이루었다. 이 내용은 그의 저서인 《管子》 〈制分〉에 보인다.
- 역주6 夫鄒與魯戰: 鄒는 춘추시대의 邾나라로 전국시대에 鄒나라로 이름이 바뀌었는데, 약소국이었다. 魯나라와 인접하여 자주 싸우다가 결국 魯나라에게 멸망당하였다. 《孟子》 〈梁惠王 下〉에 “鄒나라가 魯나라와 싸웠는데, 鄒나라 穆公이 孟子에게 ‘나의 관리들이 싸우다가 죽은 자가 33명이나 되는데도 백성들은 죽은 자가 없으니, 백성들을 처벌하여 죽이자니 너무 많아 다 죽일 수 없고 죽이지 않자니 백성들이 윗사람의 죽음을 疾視하면서 구원하지 않았으니, 어찌하면 좋습니까?’라고 물었다.[鄒與魯鬨 穆公問曰 吾有司死者三十三人 而民莫之死也 誅之則不可勝誅 不誅則疾視其長上之死而不救 如之何則可也]”라는 내용이 보인다. 疾視는 미워하는 눈초리로 상대방을 봄을 이른다.
- 역주7 孫武之法……不若則能避之: 孫武之法은 병법서인 《孫子兵法》을 이른다. 孫武는 춘추시대 齊나라 사람으로 자는 長卿이다. 뛰어난 병법가로 吳王 闔閭의 軍師가 되어 楚나라를 격파하고 齊나라와 晉나라를 위협하여 제후들 사이에서 명성이 높았으며 후세에 병법의 시조로 불린다. 저서로 《孫子兵法》 13편이 있는데, 이 내용은 〈謀功〉에 보인다.
- 역주8 河西之戍卒: 河西는 黃河의 서쪽 지방으로 지금의 陝西省 북부, 甘肅省, 寧夏 일대를 이른다. 이 지역은 宋나라와 西夏의 국경 지대로 많은 병사들이 주둔해 있었다.
- 역주9 此吳之所以肄楚: 肄楚는 楚나라를 수고롭게 함을 이른다. 춘추시대 吳王 闔閭가 楚나라를 정벌할 적에 伍員과 孫武의 계책을 따라 唐나라와 蔡나라와 동맹하고 연합군을 편성하여 漢水를 끼고 楚나라와 대치하였는데, 이때 吳나라는 3軍을 만들어 번갈아 출동시켜 楚나라 군대를 피곤하게 해서 楚나라 군대를 대파하였는바, 이를 말한 것이다.
- 역주10 隋之所以狃陳: 狃陳은 陳나라를 자주 정벌하는 것으로, 南北朝時代 말엽, 北朝를 정복한 隋 文帝가 南朝의 陳나라를 멸망시키고 天下를 통일할 적에 썼던 계책이다. 《隋書》 〈高熲傳〉에 “上(文帝)이 高熲에게 陳나라를 점령할 계책을 물었다. 高熲이 대답하기를 ‘강북은 날씨가 추워 밭작물의 수확이 다소 늦고 강남은 땅이 따뜻하여 논의 작물이 일찍 익습니다. 陳나라가 수확할 시기를 헤아려 약간의 병사와 군마를 징발하여 기습공격을 하겠다고 소문을 퍼뜨리면, 저들은 반드시 군대를 주둔시키고 방어하느라 수확할 시기를 놓치게 될 것입니다. 저들이 군대를 집결시키면 우리는 군대를 해산시키기를 두세 차례 되풀이하면, 저들은 이를 平常의 일로 여겨서 나중에 우리가 다시 군대를 집결시켜도 저들은 반드시 믿지 않고 대비하지 않을 것입니다. 저들이 머뭇거리는 사이에 우리가 군대를 도강시켜 육지로 올라가 싸우면 군대의 사기가 배가될 것입니다. 또 강남은 땅이 척박하여 집집마다 띠풀과 대나무를 많이 저장해 놓았고 곡식을 쌓아둔 것이 모두 땅속의 굴이 아니니, 은밀히 行人들을 보내서 바람을 따라 불을 놓아 태우고, 저들이 다시 수리해 세우기를 기다렸다가 다시 불을 지르면, 수년이 지나지 않아 저절로 저들의 재력을 모두 소진시킬 수 있을 것입니다.’라고 하였다. 文帝가 이 계책을 실행에 옮겼다. 이로부터 陳나라가 피폐해졌다.[上嘗問熲取陳之策 熲曰 江北地寒 田收差晩 江南土熱 水田早熟 量彼收穫之際 微徵士馬 聲言掩襲 彼必屯兵禦守 足得廢其農時 彼旣聚兵 我便解甲 再三若此 賊以爲常 後更集兵 彼必不信 猶豫之頃 我乃濟師 登陸而戰 兵氣益倍 又江南土薄 舍多竹茅 所有儲積 皆非地窖 密遣行人 因風縱火 待彼脩立 復更燒之 不出數年 自可財力俱盡 上行其策 由是陳人益弊]”라고 보인다. 行人은 원래 外交를 맡은 官名이고 또 使者를 일컫는 말이나 여기서는 왕래하는 사람을 가리킨 것으로 추측된다.
Essay-level synthesis
core objective
To demonstrate that while tactical engagements fluctuate endlessly, grand imperial strategy requires an unalterable core policy, proposing a rotational force-projection model against Western Xia by exploiting the economic and structural asymmetries between a large state and a small border state.
core thesis
While battlefield maneuvers and tactical deployments must remain fluid and responsive to daily changes, grand imperial statecraft demands an immutable strategic core. Against a smaller, cohesive border state like Western Xia, the Song empire must not squander its vast capital reserves on passive defense or dispersed garrisoning—which plays into the enemy’s strengths of desperation and internal cohesion. Instead, the empire must exploit its asymmetric resource capacity by establishing a systematic rotational force-projection model, maintaining continuous offensive pressure with minimal individual soldier fatigue while driving the adversary into structural exhaustion.
dominant persuasive strategy
Su Shi 蘇軾 employs a dialectical strategy that balances abstract statecraft axioms with cold mathematical and commercial logic. He begins by establishing cognitive authority through historical precedents (Goujian 句踐, Qin 秦, Liu Bang 劉邦), shifts into systemic structural modeling (contrasting imperial size with small-state desperation), uses a vivid commercial market metaphor (“a child of a thousand pieces of gold” (千金之子) out-competing petty peddlers) to reframe imperial wealth as kinetic leverage, and concludes with a pragmatic operational algorithm that transforms abstract strategic doctrine into actionable border policy.
macro-structural sequence
- Section 1 (Abstract Epistemological Rule): Establishes the distinction between fluid battlefield tactics (“attack and defense methods, combat techniques, changing a hundred times a day” (攻守之方，戰鬪之術，一日百變)) and the necessity of a Fixed Grand Strategy (yī dìng zhī jì | 一定之計), grounding the rule in canonical precedents of Hegemon-King statecraft.
- Section 2 (Geopolitical Prioritization & Structural Dynamics): Prioritizes the lesser Western Xia threat over the greater Khitan threat based on Guan Zhong’s principle of striking structural flaws, analyzing how large territorial size creates defensive dispersal while smallness generates concentrated desperation.
- Section 3 (Institutional Critique & Economic Analogy): Diagnoses imperial administrative vulnerabilities—such as hierarchical alienation and regulatory overgrowth (“laws and regulations are so complex that people have nowhere to put hand or foot” (法令繁而民無所措其手足))—and invokes Sun Wu’s offensive doctrine alongside a commercial market analogy to prove that large polities are built for offensive resource deployment rather than static defense.
- Section 4 (Operational Synthesis & Rotational Program): Formulates the concrete policy of Rotational Force Division (fēn qí jū zhě yǔ xíng zhě | 分其居者與行者) in Hexi 河西, using mathematical ratios to demonstrate how low-intensity, high-frequency raids inflict continuous asymmetry on Western Xia, validated by historical precedents of Wu 吳 and Sui 隋.
cross-section dynamics
Narrative. The essay moves from high-level historical analysis of ancient Hegemons and Kings (Section 1), shifts to comparative structural analysis of political size and state psychology (Section 2), transitions into an internal critique of imperial administrative formalisms and merchant economic analogies (Section 3), and culminates in a concrete, mathematically calculated rotational military program for Hexi 河西 (Section 4).
Tone. Begins with calm, authoritative philosophical gravity, elevates into sharp dialectical analysis of state vulnerabilities, intensifies into a severe critique of court defensive inertia, and closes with a confident, pragmatically persuasive policy prescription.
Epistemology. Transforms the reader’s perception of border security from a fear-based defensive mindset to a structural understanding of power, proving that imperial size without an offensive rotational strategy is a liability, but when combined with continuous rotational force projection, guarantees total strategic dominance.
Dimensions activated
Semiotics & Epistemology3 source lines cited
Su Shi 蘇軾 conducts a rigorous epistemological critique of military decision-making, exposing the cognitive error of mistaking tactical agility for strategic policy. He refutes the superficial reliance on surface fluctuations (“a hundred transformations without remaining the same” (百變而不同)), asserting that true statecraft relies on an unalterable strategic pivot (“its fixed strategy has never changed” (其一定之計未始易也)). Furthermore, he reclaims the proper semantic definition of strategic terms, dismantling the corrupt administrative interpretation of force division—which had been misconstrued as fragmented static garrisons—and restoring its functional, organic definition as rotational active force projection (“dividing those who remain garrisoned from those who field-campaign” (分其居者與行者)).
Metaphysical Ontology4 source lines cited
The text analyzes collective psychological states and systemic dynamics as primary structural variables in war. Su Shi 蘇軾 contrasts the risk-averse, hesitant psychological disposition of affluent imperial populations (“self-important and full of suspicion” (自重而多疑)) with the relentless, reckless momentum of desperate border populations (“desperate with nothing to rely on, reckless unto death” (計窮而無所恃，則致死而不顧)). He demonstrates how systemic momentum (“when structural force is provoked” (勢有所激)) can temporarily invert physical advantages, enabling a small polity to overcome a sprawling empire if the empire allows its collective energy to decay through passive defense.
Statecraft & Spatial Order1 source lines cited
Imperial statecraft is critiqued for its tendency toward administrative alienation and formalist over-regulation. Su Shi 蘇軾 observes that large empires suffer from structural distance between sovereign and subject, aloof commanders, and hyper-regulation (“laws and regulations are so complex that people have nowhere to put hand or foot” (法令繁而民無所措其手足)), which destroys natural social cohesion. To remedy this spatial and administrative sprawl, he proposes re-engineering border deployment in Hexi 河西 away from passive garrisoning and toward dynamic rotational raids, utilizing central economic superiority to exhaust peripheral insurgents without straining imperial border populations.
Historical Dynamics & Timeliness1 source lines cited
The author evaluates macro-historical trends to demonstrate that while immediate tactical conditions are unpredictable, long-term strategic arcs are fully controllable (“even across a hundred years, it can be known” (雖百年可知也)). Citing historical paradigms such as Goujian’s 句踐 deliberate strategic posture toward Wu 吳, Qin’s 秦 dissolution of rival coalitions, and Han Gaozu’s 劉邦 internal disruption of Xiang Ji’s 項籍 court, Su Shi 蘇軾 argues that historical success belongs to polities that maintain a fixed strategic axis while adapting to operational timing.
Authority, Office, & Legal Regulation1 source lines cited
Su Shi 蘇軾 critiques court decision-makers who adopt defensive postures despite commanding overwhelming resources, defining passive defense by a wealthy empire as a fundamental failure of command statecraft (“using abundance as if it were insufficiency” (以有餘而用不足之計)). He argues that imperial authority must not be bound by procedural bookkeeping or fear of short-term tactical setbacks, but must boldly exercise its structural prerogative to conduct offensive campaigns when resource ratios favor imperial expansion.
Historiography & Hermeneutics2 source lines cited
Historical narrative serves as an empirical testing ground for statecraft theory. Rather than treating classical precedents as static moral tales, Su Shi 蘇軾 extracts their operational mechanisms: analyzing how Helü 闔閭 of Wu 吳 exhausted Chu 楚 through rotational harassment (“how Wu harassed Chu” (吳之所以肄楚)) and how Sui Wendi 隋文帝 disrupted the agricultural cycle of Chen 陳 (“how Sui accustomed Chen to false alarms” (隋之所以狃陳)). Historical precedents validate the mathematical necessity of rotational harassment, proving that structural exhaustion is a timeless law of warfare.
Dialectical structural pairs
| Pair | 漢字 | Argumentative function | Resolution |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fixed Grand Strategy vs. Tactical Adaptability | 一定之計 / 攻守之方 | Contrasts volatile short-term battlefield maneuvers with long-term imperial objectives. | Tactics must adapt daily, but strategic policy must remain stubborn and immutable across decades. |
| Large Empire vs. Small Border Polity | 大國 / 小國 | Explores structural asymmetries where spatial expanse dilutes imperial strength while desperate isolation concentrates small-state force. | Reframes imperial size from a defensive burden into an offensive capital asset. |
| Offensive Projection vs. Passive Defense | 長於戰 / 長於守 | Demonstrates that passive defense rots surplus imperial assets and surrenders strategic initiative. | Mandates offensive force projection to align imperial policy with its natural resource advantages. |
| Rotational Deployment vs. Static Garrisoning | 分其居者與行者 / 分屯 | Opposes passive border troop concentration against active, rotational harassment. | Solves troop idling by dividing field-campaigning units from static garrison forces in Hexi 河西. |
Key concepts in this essay
| Term | Definition here | Weight |
|---|---|---|
| Fixed Grand Strategy (yī dìng zhī jì | 一定之計) | An unalterable macro-strategic policy that guides an empire through fluctuating tactical victories and defeats. | High |
| Rotational Force Division (fēn qí jū zhě yǔ xíng zhě | 分其居者與行者) | Operational system dividing troops into garrison units and rotating active raiding units to maintain continuous pressure on the enemy. | High |
| Attack Flaws (gōng xiá | 攻瑕) | Strategic principle derived from Guan Zhong 管仲 mandating that campaigns target lesser, vulnerable foes first to collapse adversary coalitions. | High |
| Wealthy House Heir (qiān jīn zhī zǐ | 千金之子) | Metaphor for a large, affluent empire whose wealth breeds risk aversion, hesitation, and administrative fragility. | Medium |
| Proliferation of Laws (fǎ lìng fán | 法令繁) | Over-regulation and administrative formalism that paralyze population initiative and undermine internal political cohesion. | Medium |
Stylistic fingerprint
Structural architecture. Four-phase strategic escalation (Abstract Principle → Asymmetric Analysis → Institutional Critique → Rotational Program).
Sentence rhythm. Balanced parallel antitheses (pairing the psychology of large and small states) punctuated by decisive, staccato policy formulations.
Characteristic particles. 故 (therefore) driving causal transitions, 然 (yet) executing conceptual pivots, 夫 (now/indeed) initiating analytical premises, and 且夫 (furthermore) advancing argument layers.
Register. Shifts from abstract philosophical statecraft to forensic institutional analysis, culminating in empirical military calculation.
Provenance
- record
- PH.RUN.001148
- level
- essay
- model
- gemini-3.6-flash
- processed
- 2026-07-27 18:53:39
- built from
- 蘇軾_策斷 中_section.md
- confidence
- High — All taxonomy activations are unambiguous, primary citations are verified against section inputs, and structural dynamics map cleanly onto the statecraft schema without forced fitting.
- tokens (estimate)
- ~5,800 tokens
- work
- 策斷 中 · Policy Assessment Part II
- file
- 蘇軾_策斷 中_essay.json
- record
- PH.RUN.000995
- level
- section
- model
- not recorded in file
- processed
- 2026-07-27 18:38:23
- built from
- sushi.tsv
- confidence
- High — The text features explicit structural transitions, well-defined military logic, and clear historical precedent citations.
- tokens (estimate)
- ~4,200 tokens
- file
- 蘇軾_策斷 中_section.json
Metacognitive log of the essay-level run · 5 entries
taxonomy mapping rationale. Category 1 (Semiotics) was activated due to the explicit distinction between tactical labels and strategic reality, as well as the redefinition of Force Division (fēn bīng | 分兵). Category 2 (Ontology) was activated by the detailed psychological modeling of collective population states (“child of a thousand pieces of gold” (千金之子) vs. desperate border populations). Category 5 (Statecraft) was activated by the administrative critique of legal formalisms and the Hexi 河西 rotational proposal. Category 6 (Historical Dynamics) and Category 10 (Historiography) were activated by the functional extraction of operational mechanisms from ancient historical precedents (Goujian 句踐, Wu 吳/Chu 楚, Sui 隋/Chen 陳).
concept and quote verification. All cited Chinese primary sentences and specialized terminology—such as Fixed Grand Strategy (yī dìng zhī jì | 一定之計), Rotational Force Division (fēn qí jū zhě yǔ xíng zhě | 分其居者與行者), and Hexi Border Troops (Héxī zhī shù zú | 河西之戍卒)—were strictly verified against the normalized section-level input text for *Ce Duan Zhong* (策斷 中).
unusual rhetorical structural features encountered. The text features a rare cross-domain economic analogy, applying commercial market competition (“wealthy merchant house out-competing petty peddlers” (千金之家...販夫小民)) directly to imperial military statecraft, illustrating how financial capital reserves convert into strategic endurance.
taxonomy and category gap evaluation. The concept of “rotational force mobilization to induce operational exhaustion in a cohesive adversary” straddles Category 5 (Statecraft & Spatial Order) and Category 6 (Historical Dynamics). It was synthesized primarily under Statecraft due to its concrete administrative and border troop distribution focus.
distillation rule and system improvement recommendations. - [TAXONOMY] Consider adding a dedicated sub-dimension under Category 5 for “Asymmetric Economic and Rotational Border Defense” to capture operational military rotation proposals. - [DIRECTIVE] Continue enforcing strict non-italicization of CJK text to guarantee clean Markdown and PDF compilation. - [SCHEMA] The schema successfully captured the movement from abstract strategic theory to empirical policy design without requiring forced category fitting.
Section s1 · dimensions not activated, with rationale
Cat. 2 (Metaphysical Ontology) — no discussion of material energy or innate nature; Cat. 3 (Intellectual Lineage) — no scholastic factions cited; Cat. 4 (Political Economy) — fiscal allocations not yet introduced; Cat. 5 (Statecraft & Spatial Order) — territorial administration not covered; Cat. 7 (Authority & Law) — administrative regulation absent; Cat. 8 (Intellectual Fellowship) — personal networks absent; Cat. 9 (Aesthetics) — literary theory absent; Cat. 10 (Historiography) — historical examples serve strategic argument rather than textual criticism.
Section s2 · dimensions not activated, with rationale
Cat. 1 (Semiotics) — title-substance alignment not covered; Cat. 3 (Lineage) — intellectual lineages absent; Cat. 4 (Political Economy) — fiscal policies not discussed; Cat. 5 (Statecraft) — institutional structure absent; Cat. 7 (Authority & Law) — legal codes absent; Cat. 8 (Fellowship) — elite networks absent; Cat. 9 (Aesthetics) — literary theory absent; Cat. 10 (Historiography) — textual hermeneutics absent.
Section s3 · dimensions not activated, with rationale
Cat. 1 (Semiotics) — language-reality mapping absent; Cat. 3 (Lineage) — academic affiliations absent; Cat. 4 (Political Economy) — agricultural policy absent; Cat. 6 (Historical Dynamics) — temporal windows not explicitly analyzed here; Cat. 8 (Fellowship) — personal friendship absent; Cat. 9 (Aesthetics) — art/prose theory absent; Cat. 10 (Historiography) — narrative textual editing absent.
Section s4 · dimensions not activated, with rationale
Cat. 2 (Ontology) — metaphysical nature not discussed; Cat. 3 (Lineage) — political factions absent; Cat. 4 (Political Economy) — land/taxation systems absent; Cat. 7 (Authority & Law) — criminal codes absent; Cat. 8 (Fellowship) — epistolary network absent; Cat. 9 (Aesthetics) — stylistic theory absent; Cat. 10 (Historiography) — text editing absent.